Reading the mind in cartoons and stories: an fMRI study of ‘theory of mind’ in verbal and nonverbal tasks

  title={Reading the mind in cartoons and stories: an fMRI study of ‘theory of mind’ in verbal and nonverbal tasks},
  author={Helen L. Gallagher and Francesca Happ{\'e} and Nicola Brunswick and Paul C. Fletcher and Uta Frith and Chris D. Frith},

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