Rawlsian Nash solutions

@article{Fabella1991RawlsianNS,
  title={Rawlsian Nash solutions},
  author={Raul Villasenor Fabella},
  journal={Theory and Decision},
  year={1991},
  volume={30},
  pages={113-126}
}
  • R. Fabella
  • Published 1 March 1991
  • Economics
  • Theory and Decision
We investigate the conditions which guarantee the choice of Rawlsian solutions by players of unequal maximin positions bargaining under Nash rules. The conditions, viz., subsymmetry and the location of the Pareto set, relate to the structure of the utility set,S. 
The Picketty Inequality in the Nash-Bargained Social Contract
As a proxy for a Pareto-efficient market economy, we adopt the two-party Nash Bargaining model featuring a qualitative bias in the treatment of the contributions of the parties. The PikettyExpand

References

SHOWING 1-8 OF 8 REFERENCES
The Bargaining Problem
A new treatment is presented of a classical economic problem, one which occurs in many forms, as bargaining, bilateral monopoly, etc. It may also be regarded as a nonzero-sum two-person game. In thisExpand
OTHER SOLUTIONS TO NASH'S BARGAINING PROBLEM
A two-person bargaining problem is considered. It is shown that under four axioms that describe the behavior of players there is a unique solution to such a problem. The axioms and the solutionExpand
On arguments from self-interest for the Nash solution and the Kalai egalitarian solution to the bargaining problem
I argue in this paper that there are two considerations which govern the dynamics of a two-person bargaining game, viz. relative proportionate utility loss from conceding to one's opponent's proposalExpand
The Nash Social Welfare Function
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology andExpand