• Corpus ID: 250334397

Rawlsian Assignments

@inproceedings{Demeulemeester2022RawlsianA,
  title={Rawlsian Assignments},
  author={Tom Demeulemeester and Juan Sebasti{\'a}n Pereyra},
  year={2022}
}
We study the assignment of indivisible objects to individuals when transfers are not al-lowed. Previous literature has mainly focused on efficiency (from an ex-ante and ex-post perspective), and individually fair assignments. Consequently, egalitarian concerns have been overlooked. We are inspired by the assignment of apartments in housing cooperatives where families regard the egalitarianism of the assignments as a first-order requirement. In particular, they want to avoid assignments where some… 

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