Rationalizations of Condorcet-Consistent Rules via Distances of Hamming Type

@article{Elkind2012RationalizationsOC,
  title={Rationalizations of Condorcet-Consistent Rules via Distances of Hamming Type},
  author={Edith Elkind and Piotr Faliszewski and Arkadii M. Slinko},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
  year={2012},
  volume={39},
  pages={891-905}
}
The main idea of the distance rationalizability approach to view the voters’ preferences as an imperfect approximation to some kind of consensus is deeply rooted in social choice literature. It allows one to define (“rationalize”) voting rules via a consensus class of elections and a distance: a candidate is said to be an election winner if she is ranked first in one of the nearest (with respect to the given distance) consensus elections. It is known that many classic voting rules can be… CONTINUE READING
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