Rationality authority for provable rational behavior

@inproceedings{Dolev2011RationalityAF,
  title={Rationality authority for provable rational behavior},
  author={Shlomi Dolev and Panagiota N. Panagopoulou and Mika{\"e}l Rabie and Elad Michael Schiller and Paul G. Spirakis},
  booktitle={PODC '11},
  year={2011}
}
Players in a game are assumed to be totally rational and absolutely smart. However, in reality all players may act in non-rational ways and may fail to understand and find their best actions. In particular, participants in social interactions, such as lotteries and auctions, cannot be expected to always find by themselves the "best-reply" to any situation. Indeed, agents may consult with others about the possible outcome of their actions. It is then up to the counselee to assure the rationality… Expand
Rationality Authority for Provable Rational Behavior
TLDR
A distributed computer system infrastructure, named rationality authority, that allows safe consultation among (possibly biased) parties and facilitates the applications of game theory in several important real-life scenarios by the use of computing systems. Expand
Chalmers Publication Library Rationality authority for provable rational behavior
Players in a game are assumed to be totally rational and absolutely smart. However, in reality all players may act in non-rational ways and may fail to understand and find their best actions. InExpand
A Proof-Carrying Code Approach to Certificate Auction Mechanisms
TLDR
A proof-carrying code approach using Coq wherein auction protocols can be specified and desirable properties be proven enables software agents to automatically certify claimed auction properties and assist them in their decision-making. Expand
The Reality Game Theory Imposes (Short Summary)
  • S. Dolev
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • Algorithms, Probability, Networks, and Games
  • 2015
I was lucky to be exposed to game theory by Paul Spirakis, moreover to have my first PhD student, Elad Schiller staying with Paul as his PostDoc. It was a great opportunity to examine and think aboutExpand
A framework for service enterprise workflow simulation with multi-agents cooperation
TLDR
A service workflow-oriented framework for the process simulation of service businesses using multi-agent cooperation to address the above issues is proposed and social rationality of agent is introduced into the proposed framework. Expand

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 26 REFERENCES
Realising Common Knowledge Assumptions in Agent Auctions
TLDR
It is shown that it is not feasible for an agent to determine the properties of any arbitrary specification, unless information about the properties is communicated and/or certain restrictions are placed on the specification. Expand
An Algorithmic Approach to Specifying and Verifying Subgame Perfect Equilibria
Game theory is a popular tool for designing interaction protocols for agent systems. It is currently not clear how to apply this to open agent systems. By “open” we mean that foreign agents will beExpand
Verifying Dominant Strategy Equilibria in Auctions
TLDR
This paper shows how the Alloy model checker can be used to automatically verify the game-theoretic properties of a given auction mechanism, especially the property of strategyproofness. Expand
Applying game theory mechanisms in open agent systems with complete information
  • Frank Guerin
  • Computer Science
  • Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
  • 2006
TLDR
A machine readable language in which a game theory mechanism can be written in the form of an agent interaction protocol, which allows the workings of the protocol to be made public so that agents can inspect it to determine its properties and hence their best strategy. Expand
Game authority for robust and scalable distributed selfish-computer systems
TLDR
This work proposes using a game authority middleware for enforcing the moral code on selfish agents using suitable assumptions on failures and honest selfishness in order to predict the game outcome. Expand
Strategies for repeated games with subsystem takeovers implementable by deterministic and self-stabilising automata
TLDR
It is proved that all unplanned punishments eventually cease by showing that the automata can recover from transient faults, and construct deterministic automata that implement strategies that deter the coordinator from deviating in infinitely repeated games. Expand
Programming and Verifying Subgame-Perfect Mechanisms
  • M. Pauly
  • Computer Science
  • J. Log. Comput.
  • 2005
TLDR
It is shown that an extension of Hoare's original calculus is sound and complete for reasoning about subgame-perfect equilibria in game-theoretic mechanisms, and used to verify some simple mechanisms like the Dutch auction. Expand
Atomic congestion games among coalitions
TLDR
A generalized fully mixed Nash equilibrium is proposed that can be efficiently constructed in most cases and is demonstrated convergence to robust PNE which are robust against (even dynamically forming) coalitions of small size. Expand
Strategies for repeated games with subsystem takeovers: implementable by deterministic and self-stabilizing automata (extended abstract)
TLDR
It is proved that all unplanned punishments eventually cease by showing that the automata can recover from transient faults, as well as constructing deterministic and finite automata that implement these strategies with optimal complexity. Expand
Quasi-Proportional Mechanisms: Prior-Free Revenue Maximization
TLDR
This work proposes quasi-proportional allocation methods in which the probability that an item is allocated to a bidder depends (quasi-proportionally) on the bids, and gives an algorithm to compute this equilibrium in polynomial time. Expand
...
1
2
3
...