Rationality authority for provable rational behavior

@inproceedings{Dolev2011RationalityAF,
  title={Rationality authority for provable rational behavior},
  author={Shlomi Dolev and Panagiota N. Panagopoulou and Mika{\"e}l Rabie and Elad Michael Schiller and Paul G. Spirakis},
  booktitle={PODC '11},
  year={2011}
}
Players in a game are assumed to be totally rational and absolutely smart. However, in reality all players may act in non-rational ways and may fail to understand and find their best actions. In particular, participants in social interactions, such as lotteries and auctions, cannot be expected to always find by themselves the "best-reply" to any situation. Indeed, agents may consult with others about the possible outcome of their actions. It is then up to the counselee to assure the rationality… 

Chalmers Publication Library Rationality authority for provable rational behavior

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