Rationality, Inaccurate Mental Models, and Self-Confirming Equilibrium: A New Understanding of the American Revolution

Abstract

Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University; and Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, and Ward C. Krebs Family Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science, Stanford University. The authors gratefully acknowledge helpful conversations with Colin Camerer, John Ferejohn, Robert Gibbons, Stephen Krasner, David Laitin, Mathew McCubbins… (More)

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@inproceedings{Camerer2002RationalityIM, title={Rationality, Inaccurate Mental Models, and Self-Confirming Equilibrium: A New Understanding of the American Revolution}, author={Colin F. Camerer and John A. Ferejohn and Robert Gibbons and Stephen D. Krasner and David D Laitin and Mathew D. McCubbins and Paul Milgrom and James D. Morrow and Douglass C. North and Robert Powell and A L B Lex Rutten and Thomas J. Sargent and Robert B. Wilson and Rui and D. O. Figueiredo and Jack Rakove and Barry R. Weingast}, year={2002} }