Rationalist explanations for war?

@article{Kirshner2000RationalistEF,
  title={Rationalist explanations for war?},
  author={Jonathan Kirshner},
  journal={Security Studies},
  year={2000},
  volume={10},
  pages={143 - 150}
}
  • J. Kirshner
  • Published 1 September 2000
  • Economics
  • Security Studies
TAMES FEARON'S influential 1995 paper provides a carefully argued exploration of I what can be considered to be a "rationalist" explanation for war. He first J considers a number of purportedly rationalist explanations, such as the existence of some actors with positive expected utility from war, and argues that they do not provide an adequate or complete foundation for a truly rationalist explanation. Ultimately, such approaches cannot resolve the following puzzle: since war is unambiguously… 
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References

Rationalist explanations for war
Realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war. Against this view, I show that under very