Corpus ID: 152659362

Rational interaction : essays in honor of John C. Harsanyi

  title={Rational interaction : essays in honor of John C. Harsanyi},
  author={Reinhard Selten and J. Harsanyi},
  • Reinhard Selten, J. Harsanyi
  • Published 1992
  • Economics
  • I. Cooperative Game Theory.- The Consistent Shapley Value for Games without Side Payments.- Fictitious-Transfer Solutions in Cooperative Game Theory.- The Finagle Point for Characteristic Function Games.- Voting Count and Account.- Fee Games: (N)TU-Games with Incomplete Information.- A Non-Cooperative Interpretation of Value and Potential.- II. Mechanism Design.- Types Decomposition and Perfect Implementations.- Fair Division under Asymmetric Information.- Non-Transferable Utility and Bayesian… CONTINUE READING
    20 Citations
    Chapter 41 Strategic equilibrium
    • 13
    A Principal-Agent Approach to Transmission Expansion—Part I: Regulatory Framework
    • 12
    • PDF
    Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games
    • 10
    • PDF
    Bargaining with commitments
    • 21
    Collinearity between the Shapley value and the egalitarian division rules for cooperative games
    • 10
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    Multilateral bargaining with concession costs
    • 23
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