Rational endorsement

@article{Fleisher2018RationalE,
  title={Rational endorsement},
  author={Will Fleisher},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
  year={2018},
  volume={175},
  pages={2649-2675}
}
It is valuable for inquiry to have researchers who are committed advocates of their own theories. However, in light of pervasive disagreement (and other concerns), such a commitment is not well explained by the idea that researchers believe their theories. Instead, this commitment, the rational attitude to take toward one’s favored theory during the course of inquiry, is what I call endorsement. Endorsement is a doxastic attitude, but one which is governed by a different type of epistemic… Expand
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