Rational Souls and the Beginning of Life (A Reply to Robert Pasnau)

@article{Haldane2003RationalSA,
  title={Rational Souls and the Beginning of Life (A Reply to Robert Pasnau)},
  author={John Warner Haldane and Patrick Lee},
  journal={Philosophy},
  year={2003},
  volume={78},
  pages={532 - 540}
}
The present essay takes up matters discussed by Robert Pasnau in his response (published in the same issue of Philosophy) to our previous criticism of his account of Aquinas's view of when a foetus acquires a human soul. We are mainly concerned with metaphysical and biological issues and argue that the kind of organization required for ensoulment is that sufficient for the full development of a human being, and that this is present from conception. We contend that in his criticisms of our… 

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