Rational Protocol Design: Cryptography against Incentive-Driven Adversaries

@article{Garay2013RationalPD,
  title={Rational Protocol Design: Cryptography against Incentive-Driven Adversaries},
  author={J. Garay and Jonathan Katz and U. Maurer and Bj{\"o}rn Tackmann and Vassilis Zikas},
  journal={2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science},
  year={2013},
  pages={648-657}
}
  • J. Garay, Jonathan Katz, +2 authors Vassilis Zikas
  • Published 2013
  • Computer Science
  • 2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
  • Existing work on "rational cryptographic protocols" treats each party (or coalition of parties) running the protocol as a selfish agent trying to maximize its utility. In this work we propose a fundamentally different approach that is better suited to modeling a protocol under attack from an external entity. Specifically, we consider a two-party game between an protocol designer and an external attacker. The goal of the attacker is to break security properties such as correctness or privacy… CONTINUE READING
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