• DOI:10.1109/FOCS.2013.75
Corpus ID: 10904321

Rational Protocol Design: Cryptography against Incentive-Driven Adversaries

@article{Garay2013RationalPD,
  title={Rational Protocol Design: Cryptography against Incentive-Driven Adversaries},
  author={J. Garay and Jonathan Katz and U. Maurer and Bj{\"o}rn Tackmann and Vassilis Zikas},
  journal={2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science},
  year={2013},
  pages={648-657}
}

J. Garay, Jonathan Katz, +2 authors Vassilis Zikas

Published 2013

Computer Science

2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science

Existing work on "rational cryptographic protocols" treats each party (or coalition of parties) running the protocol as a selfish agent trying to maximize its utility. In this work we propose a fundamentally different approach that is better suited to modeling a protocol under attack from an external entity. Specifically, we consider a two-party game between an protocol designer and an external attacker. The goal of the attacker is to break security properties such as correctness or privacy… CONTINUE READING

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