Rational Deterrence and Crisis Stability

@article{Langlois1991RationalDA,
  title={Rational Deterrence and Crisis Stability},
  author={Jean-Pierre P. Langlois},
  journal={American Journal of Political Science},
  year={1991},
  volume={35},
  pages={801}
}
This paper presents a new game theoretic model of nuclear crises that maintains consistency with the usual "chicken" and prisoner's dilemma metaphors. Within a "repeated continuous game" framework, it establishes the existence of totally credible (because always optimal) deterrence strategies that are the expression of threats of graduated retaliations in response to an encroachment of status quo. Drawing a careful distinction between the three fundamental kinds of nuclear threats (the risk of… 
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