Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty

@article{Dekel1990RationalBW,
  title={Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty},
  author={Eddie Dekel and Drew Fudenberg},
  journal={Journal of Economic Theory},
  year={1990},
  volume={52},
  pages={243-267}
}

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TLDR
This paper focuses on the non-cooperative analysis of games with some dynamic structure in which the choice of one move or another during the play of the game may convey valuable information to the other players.