Ranking intersecting Lorenz curves

@article{Aaberge2004RankingIL,
  title={Ranking intersecting Lorenz curves},
  author={Rolf Aaberge},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
  year={2004},
  volume={33},
  pages={235-259}
}
  • R. Aaberge
  • Published 1 January 2004
  • Economics
  • Social Choice and Welfare
This paper is concerned with the problem of ranking Lorenz curves in situations where the Lorenz curves intersect and no unambiguous ranking can be attained without introducing weaker ranking criteria than first-degree Lorenz dominance. To deal with such situations two alternative sequences of nested dominance criteria between Lorenz curves are introduced. At the limit the systems of dominance criteria appear to depend solely on the income share of either the worst-off or the best-off income… 

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