Randomized Partial Checking Revisited

Abstract

We study mix-nets with randomized partial checking (RPC) as proposed by Jakobsson, Juels, and Rivest (2002). RPC is a technique to verify the correctness of an execution both for Chaumian and homomorphic mix-nets. The idea is to relax the correctness and privacy requirements to achieve a more efficient mix-net. We identify serious issues in the original description of mix-nets with RPC and show how to exploit these to break both correctness and privacy, both for Chaumian and homomorphic mix-nets. Our attacks are practical and applicable to real world mix-net implementations, e.g., the Civitas and the Scantegrity voting systems.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-36095-4_8

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Cite this paper

@article{Khazaei2012RandomizedPC, title={Randomized Partial Checking Revisited}, author={Shahram Khazaei and Douglas Wikstr{\"{o}m}, journal={IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive}, year={2012}, volume={2012}, pages={63} }