Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects

@article{Kojima2009RandomAO,
  title={Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects},
  author={Fuhito Kojima},
  journal={Mathematical Social Sciences},
  year={2009},
  volume={57},
  pages={134-142}
}
We consider random assignment of multiple indivisible objects. When each agent receives one object, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) show that the probabilistic serial mechanism is ordinally efficient, envy-free and weakly strategy-proof. When each agent receives more than one object, we propose a generalized probabilistic serial mechanism that is ordinally efficient and envy-free but not weakly strategy-proof. Our main result shows that, if each agent receives more than one object, there exists… CONTINUE READING
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