We study in detail the role of short-cuts in promoting the emergence of cooperation in a network of agents playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG). We introduce a model whose topology interpolates between the one-dimensional euclidean lattice (a ring) and the complete graph by changing the value of one parameter (the probability p to add a link between… (More)

@article{Vilone2010RandomTA,
title={Random Topologies and the emergence of cooperation: the role of short-cuts},
author={Daniele Vilone and {\'A}ngel S{\'a}nchez and Jes{\'u}s G{\'o}mez-Garde{\~n}es},
journal={CoRR},
year={2010},
volume={abs/1010.3547}
}

Figure 1. Cooperator density ρC [for temptation values of b = 1.05 (circles) and b = 1.25 (diamonds)] in the asymptotic state for LASW networks with m = 1 and N = 1000 as a function of the link-adding probability p. All agents use the UI update rule. Note the logarithmic scale of the x axis.