Ramon Llull: from ‘Ars electionis’ to social choice theory

@article{Colomer2013RamonLF,
  title={Ramon Llull: from ‘Ars electionis’ to social choice theory},
  author={Josep M. Colomer},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
  year={2013},
  volume={40},
  pages={317-328}
}
  • J. Colomer
  • Published 1 February 2013
  • Economics
  • Social Choice and Welfare
Ramon Llull (Majorca c.1232–1316) is one of the earliest founding fathers of voting theory and social choice theory. The present article places Llull’s contributions and discussion in the historical context of elections in the medieval Church and the emergence of majority rule as a new general principle for making enforceable collective decisions in replacement of traditional unanimous requirements. To make the majority principle operational, Llull initially proposed a system of exhaustive… 

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