Rackets , Regulation and the Rule of Law

@inproceedings{Frye2000RacketsR,
  title={Rackets , Regulation and the Rule of Law},
  author={Timothy J Frye},
  year={2000}
}
Governments that levy predatory regulation and provide few weak legal institutions draw businesses into the unofficial economy and compel them to hire private protection organizations. Based on a survey of shopkeepers in three cities in Russia, we find that retail shops face very high levels of predatory regulation and have frequent contacts with private protection rackets. In addition, we show that higher levels of regulation are associated with weaker legal institutions and a higher… CONTINUE READING
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