Corpus ID: 16460760

R 1 2 A Model of Heuristic Judgment

  title={R 1 2 A Model of Heuristic Judgment},
  author={D. Kahneman and S. Frederick},
  • D. Kahneman, S. Frederick
  • Published 2005
  • The program of research now known as the heuristics and biases approach began with a study of the statistical intuitions of experts, who were found to be excessively confident in the replicability of results from small samples (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971 ). The persistence of such systematic errors in the intuitions of experts implied that their intuitive judgments may be governed by fundamentally different processes than the slower, more deliberate computations they had been trained to execute… CONTINUE READING

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