• Corpus ID: 16460760

R 1 2 A Model of Heuristic Judgment

@inproceedings{Kahneman2005R12,
  title={R 1 2 A Model of Heuristic Judgment},
  author={Daniel Kahneman and Shane Frederick},
  year={2005}
}

• D. Kahneman, S. Frederick
• Published 2005
• Psychology

The program of research now known as the heuristics and biases approach began with a study of the statistical intuitions of experts, who were found to be excessively confident in the replicability of results from small samples (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971 ). The persistence of such systematic errors in the intuitions of experts implied that their intuitive judgments may be governed by fundamentally different processes than the slower, more deliberate computations they had been trained to execute. From its earliest days, the heuristics and biases program was guided by the idea that intuitive judgments occupy a position – perhaps corresponding to evolutionary history – between the automatic parallel operations of perception and the controlled serial operations of reasoning. Intuitive judgments were viewed as an extension of perception to judgment objects that are not currently present, including mental representations that are evoked by language. The mental representations on which intuitive judgments operate are similar to percepts. Indeed, the distinction between perception and judgment is often blurry: The perception of a stranger as menacing entails a prediction of future harm. The ancient idea that cognitive processes can be partitioned into two main families – traditionally called intuition and reason – is now widely embraced under the general label of dual-process theories (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Evans and Over, 1996; Hammond, 1996; Sloman, 1996, 2002 ; see Evans, Chap. 8). Dual-process models come in many flavors, but all distinguish cognitive operations that are quick and associative from others that are slow and governed by rules (Gilbert, 1999). To represent intuitive and deliberate reasoning, we borrow the terms “system 1 ” and “system 2” from Stanovich and West (2002). Although suggesting two autonomous homunculi, such a meaning is not intended. We use the term “system” only as a label for collections of cognitive processes that can be distinguished by their speed, their controllability, and the contents on which they operate. In the particular dual-process model we assume, system 1 quickly proposes intuitive answers to judgment problems as they arise, and system 2 monitors the quality of