Quining diet qualia

  title={Quining diet qualia},
  author={Keith Frankish},
  journal={Consciousness and Cognition},
  • Keith Frankish
  • Published 1 June 2012
  • Philosophy
  • Consciousness and Cognition
Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness
Theories of consciousness typically address the hard problem. They accept that phenomenal consciousness is real and aim to explain how it comes to exist. There is, however, another approach, which
The illusion of conscious experience
A new theory of phenomenal introspection is presented and it is argued that it might deal with the task at hand and defend the apparent absurdity of illusionism.
Consciousness regained? Philosophical arguments for and against reductive physicalism
  • T. Sturm
  • Philosophy
    Dialogues in clinical neuroscience
  • 2012
This paper is an overview of recent discussions concerning the mind-body problem, which is being addressed at the interface between philosophy and neuroscience. It focuses on phenomenal features of
Illusionism and definitions of phenomenal consciousness
This paper aims to uncover where the disagreement between illusionism and anti-illusionism about phenomenal consciousness lies fundamentally. While illusionists claim that phenomenal consciousness
The Normative Challenge for Illusionist Views of Consciousness
  • F. Kammerer
  • Philosophy, Psychology
    Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy
  • 2019
Illusionists about phenomenal consciousness claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist but merely seems to exist. At the same time, it is quite intuitive for there to be some kind of link
Cognitive Approaches to Phenomenal Consciousness
To my mind, the most promising approaches to understanding phenomenal consciousness are what I’ll call cognitive approaches, the most notable exemplars of which are the theories of consciousness
If materialism is true, the United States is probably conscious
If you’re a materialist, you probably think that rabbits are conscious. And you ought to think that. After all, rabbits are a lot like us, biologically and neurophysiologically. If you’re a
Eliminativism About Consciousness
In this chapter, a radical philosophical position about consciousness is examined: eliminativism, which claims that consciousness does not exist and/or that talk of consciousness should be eliminated from science.
Not Disillusioned: Reply to Commentators
I am grateful to the commentary authors for their contributions. The aim of this special issue is to give the reader a sense of the potential of illusionism as an approach to consciousness, and the
Does Experience Have Phenomenal Properties?
What assumptions are built into the claim that experience has “phenomenal properties,” and could these assumptions turn out to be false? I consider the issue specifically for the similarity relations


Quining Qualia
"Qualia" is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. As is so often the case with philosophical jargon, it is easier to give
Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts
We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? To defend materialism, philosophical
Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory
1. Assumptions, distinctions, and a map 2. Perspectival, subjective, and worldly facts 3. Explanatory gaps and qualia 4. Naturalisation and narrow content 5. First-order representationalism 6.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness
This paper is a response to the 26 commentaries on my paper "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness". First, I respond to deflationary critiques, including those that argue that there is no "hard"
Consciousness, Color, and Content
Experiences and feelings are inherently conscious states. There is something it is like to feel pain, to have an itch, to experience bright red. Philosophers call this sort of consciousness
Consciousness Reconsidered.Raw Feeling: a Philosophical Account of the Essence of Consciousness
Part 1 Raw feeling and the intelligibility gap: Anna problems the plot relational accounts and the infinite regress objection Jackson's defence of a relational analysis states, processes and ontology
Conceivability and possibility
We often decide whether a state of affairs is possible (impossible) by trying to mentally depict a scenario (using words, images, etc.) where the state in question obtains (or fails to obtain). These
Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States
En discutant les arguments recents d'anti-reductionnistes en psychologie, l'A. montre que les approches materialistes et reductionnistes des neurosciences ne sont pas necessairement une menace pour
Reflections and replies : essays on the philosophy of Tyler Burge
Tyler Burge has produced groundbreaking work on the semantics of proper names and indexicals, de re belief, formal truth theories, semantic and epistemic paradoxes, the philosophy of Gottlob Frege,
The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory
I. PRELIMINARIES 1. Two Concepts of Mind 2. Supervenience and Explanation II. THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 3. Can Consciousness be Reductively Explained? 4. Naturalistic Dualism 5. The Paradox