Quining Qualia

@inproceedings{Dennett1993QuiningQ,
  title={Quining Qualia},
  author={Daniel C. Dennett},
  year={1993}
}
"Qualia" is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. As is so often the case with philosophical jargon, it is easier to give examples than to give a definition of the term. Look at a glass of milk at sunset; the way it looks to you--the particular, personal, subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the quale of your visual experience at the moment. The way the milk tastes to you then is another, gustatory quale, and how… 

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