Quine, Putnam, and the ‘Quine–Putnam’ Indispensability Argument

  title={Quine, Putnam, and the ‘Quine–Putnam’ Indispensability Argument},
  author={David Liggins},
Much recent discussion in the philosophy of mathematics has concerned the indispensability argument—an argument which aims to establish the existence of abstract mathematical objects through appealing to the role that mathematics plays in empirical science. The indispensability argument is standardly attributed to W. V. Quine and Hilary Putnam. In this paper, I show that this attribution is mistaken. Quine’s argument for the existence of abstract mathematical objects differs from the argument… 

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