• Corpus ID: 230523868

Quickest Detection of Deception Attacks in Networked Control Systems with Physical Watermarking

@inproceedings{Naha2021QuickestDO,
  title={Quickest Detection of Deception Attacks in Networked Control Systems with Physical Watermarking},
  author={Arunava Naha and Andr{\'e} M. H. Teixeira and Anders Ahl{\'e}n and Subhrakanti Dey},
  year={2021}
}
In this paper, we propose and analyze an attack detection scheme for securing the physical layer of a networked control system against attacks where the adversary replaces the true observations with stationary false data. An independent and identically distributed watermarking signal is added to the optimal linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) control inputs, and a cumulative sum (CUSUM) test is carried out using the joint distribution of the innovation signal and the watermarking signal for… 

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