Query Complexity of Approximate Equilibria in Anonymous Games

@article{Goldberg2015QueryCO,
  title={Query Complexity of Approximate Equilibria in Anonymous Games},
  author={Paul W. Goldberg and Stefano Turchetta},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2015},
  volume={abs/1412.6455}
}
We study the computation of equilibria of two-strategy anonymous games, via algorithms that may proceed via a sequence of adaptive queries to the game's payoff function, assumed to be unknown initially. The general topic we consider is query complexity, that is, how many queries are necessary or sufficient to compute an exact or approximate Nash equilibrium. We show that exact equilibria cannot be found via query-efficient algorithms. We also give an example of a 2-strategy, 3-player… 

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