Quasi-Cores in Bargaining sets

@article{Shimomura1997QuasiCoresIB,
  title={Quasi-Cores in Bargaining sets},
  author={Ken-Ichi Shimomura},
  journal={Int. J. Game Theory},
  year={1997},
  volume={26},
  pages={283-302}
}
We propose a nonempty-valued subsolution of the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set on the class of TU games satisfying grand coalition zero-monotonicity, a weaker condition than superadditivity, zero-monotouicity and balaneedness. The subsolution is a slight modification of the Shapley-Shubik Quasi-Core. The Zhou Bargaining Set is a refinement of the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set. We also give a nonempty-valued subsolution of the Zhou Bargaining Set on the class of all TU games satisfying grand coalition… CONTINUE READING

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