Quantity of experience: brain-duplication and degrees of consciousness

@article{Bostrom2006QuantityOE,
  title={Quantity of experience: brain-duplication and degrees of consciousness},
  author={Nick Bostrom},
  journal={Minds and Machines},
  year={2006},
  volume={16},
  pages={185-200}
}
  • N. Bostrom
  • Published 1 May 2006
  • Computer Science
  • Minds and Machines
If a brain is duplicated so that there are two brains in identical states, are there then two numerically distinct phenomenal experiences or only one? There are two, I argue, and given computationalism, this has implications for what it is to implement a computation. I then consider what happens when a computation is implemented in a system that either uses unreliable components or possesses varying degrees of parallelism. I show that in some of these cases there can be, in a deep and… 
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