Quantifying inefficiency in cost-sharing mechanisms

@article{Roughgarden2009QuantifyingII,
  title={Quantifying inefficiency in cost-sharing mechanisms},
  author={Tim Roughgarden and Mukund Sundararajan},
  journal={J. ACM},
  year={2009},
  volume={56},
  pages={23:1-23:33}
}
In a cost-sharing problem, several participants with unknown preferences vie to receive some good or service, and each possible outcome has a known cost. A cost-sharing mechanism is a protocol that decides which participants are allocated a good and at what prices. Three desirable properties of a cost-sharing mechanism are: incentive-compatibility, meaning that participants are motivated to bid their true private value for receiving the good; budget-balance, meaning that the mechanism recovers… 

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