Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes

@article{Quine1956QuantifiersAP,
  title={Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes},
  author={W. V. Quine},
  journal={The Journal of Philosophy},
  year={1956},
  volume={53},
  pages={177-187}
}
  • W. V. Quine
  • Published 1956
  • Philosophy
  • The Journal of Philosophy
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