Quality, Not Quantity: An Analysis of Confidential Settlements and Litigants' Economic Incentives

@article{Lothes2005QualityNQ,
  title={Quality, Not Quantity: An Analysis of Confidential Settlements and Litigants' Economic Incentives},
  author={Alison Lothes},
  journal={University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
  year={2005},
  volume={154},
  pages={433}
}
  • Alison Lothes
  • Published 2005
  • Economics
  • University of Pennsylvania Law Review
The recent rise of “sunshine” legislation, which prohibits or reduces secret settlements of civil lawsuits, highlights public unease with confidential settlements. Recurring, highly publicized, dangerous events expose the costs of confidentiality: the Bridgestone/Firestone tire scandal and the Catholic Church sex abuse scandal are the most recent. Litigation regarding the Dalkon Shield, the Ford Pinto, and 
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