Corpus ID: 5316654

Qualitative Grounds

  title={Qualitative Grounds},
  author={J. S. Russell},
Suppose that all non-qualitative facts are grounded in qualitative facts. I argue that this view naturally comes with a picture in which trans-world identity is indeterminate. But this in turn leads to either pervasive indeterminacy in the non-qualitative, or else contingency in what facts about modality and possible worlds are determinate. 1 Ground and Necessity Shamik Dasgupta argues that we shouldn’t think there are any fundamental facts about particular individuals: these would be… Expand
4 Citations

Figures from this paper

Holes in Spacetime: Some Neglected Essentials
The hole argument purports to show that all spacetime theories of a certain form are indeterministic, including the General Theory of Relativity. The argument has given rise to an industry ofExpand
How to Be a Spacetime Substantivalist
The consensus among spacetime substantivalists is to respond to Leibniz’s classic shift arguments, and their contemporary incarnation in the form of the hole argument, by pruning the allegedlyExpand
Background independence: Lessons for further decades of dispute
Abstract Background independence begins life as an informal property that a physical theory might have, often glossed as ‘doesn't posit a fixed spacetime background’. Interest in trying to offer aExpand


No Work for a Theory of Grounding
Abstract It has recently been suggested that a distinctive metaphysical relation— ‘Grounding’—is ultimately at issue in contexts in which some goings-on are said to hold ‘in virtue of’’, beExpand
Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction
This essay is a plea for ideological toleration. Philosophers are right to be fussy about the words they use, especially in metaphysics where bad vocabulary has been a source of grief down throughExpand
On the Plurality of Grounds
© 2014 Shamik Dasgupta This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. R ecent metaphysics has contained a good deal of discussion about the notionExpand
In earlier work I argued (following Hugh Chandler) that the conventionally accepted system S5 of (first-order) modal propositional logic, and even the weaker system S4, embody an invalid pattern ofExpand
Can We Do without Fundamental Individuals ?
According to qualitativism, individuals aren’t ‘primitive’, or fundamental; all fundamental facts are purely qualitative. Some reasons to believe it are narrowly scientific, stemming from (forExpand
Against Vague Existence
In my book Four-dimensionalism (chapter 4, section 9), I argued that fourdimensionalism – the doctrine of temporal parts – follows from several other premises, chief among which is the premise thatExpand
On What Grounds What
ion: The grounding relations are relations of abstraction. The derivative entities, in order to be an ‘‘ontological free lunch’’ and count as no further addition, ought to be already latent withinExpand
Determinism and Modality
The hole argument contends that a substantivalist has to view General Relativity as an indeterministic theory. A recent form of substantivalist reply to the hole argument has urged theExpand
The Identity of Indiscernibles
The principle of the identity of indiscernibles would seem, in the forms in which it is usually stated, to be at best contingently true. It does not appear that even Leibniz held it to be logicallyExpand
Against Grounding Necessitarianism
Can there be grounding without necessitation? Can a fact obtain wholly in virtue of metaphysically more fundamental facts, even though there are possible worlds at which the latter facts obtain butExpand