QUASI-CORES IN A MONETARY ECONOMY WITH NONCONVEX PREFERENCES

@article{Shapley1966QUASICORESIA,
  title={QUASI-CORES IN A MONETARY ECONOMY WITH NONCONVEX PREFERENCES},
  author={Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik},
  journal={Econometrica},
  year={1966},
  volume={34},
  pages={805}
}
Abstract : A model of a pure exchange economy is investigated without the usual assumption of convex preference sets for the participating traders. The concept of core, taken from the theory of games, is applied to show that if there are sufficiently many participants, the economy as a whole will possess a solution that is sociologically stable--i.e., that cannot profitably be upset by any coalition of traders. 

Figures from this paper

Oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders: An asymptotic interpretation☆
Abstract This paper tries to make relevant for a finite economy the results of Shitovitz on the “pricing-out” of cores of economies with a non-atomles measure space of agents. It is hoped that the
On cores and indivisibility
Abstract An economic model of trading in commodities that are inherently indivisible, like houses, is investigated from a game-theoretic point of view. The concepts of balanced game and core are
A uniform core convergence result for non-convex economies
Abstract We prove a uniform convergence result for core allocations in non-convex economies. Representing all preferences by the minimum expenditure functions using a decentralizing price system, a
On Cores and Ewmsibility*
An economic model of trading in commodities that are inherently indivisible, like houses, is investigated from a game-theoretic point of view. The concepts of balanced game and core are developed,
Information and Small Group Effectiveness in Large Quasilinear Economies
In large quasilinear economies, we provide sufficient conditions to establish the nonemptiness of several versions of approximate interim cores with endogenous communication. This is done by proving
Approximate cores of replica games and economies
Abstract A model of a coalition production economy allowing set-up costs, indivisibilities,and nonconvexities is developed. It is shown that for all sufficiently large replications, approximate cores
The "Bridge Game" Economy: An Example of Indivisibilities
  • M. Shubik
  • Economics
    Journal of Political Economy
  • 1971
Abstract : Most of the mathematics associated with the more general cases of production with indivisibilities than are dealt with here has been presented by Shapley and Shubik elsewhere in an article
Values of Non-Atomic Games, Part V: Monetary Economies
Abstract : The report concludes a five-part series on the mathematical theory of non-atomic games. The term non-atomic, borrowed from measure theory and probability theory, signifies that in these
The Not-quite Non-atomic game:: the Role of Differentiability for the Core of Production Games
In Aumman and Shapley (1974), hereafter referred to as A/S, is presented a remarkable study of non-atomic games. In that paper the question of the relation between the core and the Shapley value of
Competitive outcomes in the cores of market games
The competitive outcomes of an economic system are known, under quite general conditions, always to lie in the core of the associated cooperative game. It is shown here that every “market game”
...
1
2
3
4
5
...

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 10 REFERENCES
The Convexity Assumption in the Theory of Competitive Markets
  • M. Farrell
  • Economics
    Journal of Political Economy
  • 1959
The object of this paper is to examine how far the allocation of resources brought about by s perfectly competitive market remains optimal when indifference maps and production functions cease to be
Concepts and Theories of Pure Competition.
Abstract : A classical formulation of the marketplace is examined from three different theoretical view points, and the three solutions that result are contrasted. When the number of participants is
The core of a cooperative game without side payments
The core of an M-person game, though used already by von Neumann and Morgenstern [15], was first explicitly defined by Gillies [5]. Gillies's definition is restricted to cooperative games with side
Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
The use of side payments in the classical theory of ^-person games involves three restrictive assumptions. First, there must be a common medium of exchange (such as money) in which the side payments
On Convexity, Efficiency, and Markets
  • F. Bator
  • Economics
    Journal of Political Economy
  • 1961
IN HIS stimulating article, "The Convexity Assumption in the Theory of Competitive Markets,"1 Mr. M. J. Farrell proposes "to reduce the minimum assumptions necessary for the validity of the 'received
On a theorem of scarf