• DOI:10.1007/978-3-030-46973-3_12
• Corpus ID: 226670546

QBism from a Phenomenological Point of View: Husserl and QBism

@inproceedings{Tremblaye2020QBismFA,
  title={QBism from a Phenomenological Point of View: Husserl and QBism},
  author={Laura de la Tremblaye},
  year={2020}
}

• Laura de la Tremblaye
• Published 2020
• Philosophy

The recent introduction of a Bayesian interpretation of the equations of quantum mechanics led us to reconsider the status of physical theories and our relation to knowledge. From the QBist point of view, the quantum state, that generates probabilities by way of the Born rule, is not referring to the microsystem anymore, but rather to the possible results of an observation originating from a certain user. Yet, if the user does not have directly access to the object, how can one be said to acquire knowledge? In order to characterize the QBist position and to explore these issues, we will confront QBism with another approach to knowledge stemming from philosophy, namely: Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. According to Husserl’s theory of perception, bodily objects are constituted through the observation of their profiles. Varying profiles are connected by the subject into a single unit that is endowed with identity through time. In the present moment, the subject anticipates the potential future experiences she will have of this unit, taking into account its noematic structure and her past experiences of earlier profiles. This process is what Husserl calls the “intentional horizon”. There is an obvious connection between the intentional horizon and the QBist interpretation of quantum states, that will be explored in details. For both QBism and phenomenology, gaining knowledge consists in making anticipations and actualizing them through observations. QBism, and its phenomenological roots, then reveals a very basic layer of knowledge that can no longer be ignored by theoretical physics.