Putting Peer Prediction Under the Micro(economic)scope and Making Truth-Telling Focal

@article{Kong2016PuttingPP,
  title={Putting Peer Prediction Under the Micro(economic)scope and Making Truth-Telling Focal},
  author={Yuqing Kong and Katrina Ligett and Grant Schoenebeck},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2016},
  volume={abs/1603.07319}
}
  • Yuqing Kong, Katrina Ligett, Grant Schoenebeck
  • Published 2016
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • ArXiv
  • Peer-predictioni¾?[19] is a meta-mechanism which, given any proper scoring rule, produces a mechanism to elicit prie information from self-interested agents. Formally, truth-telling is a strict Nash equilibrium of the mechanism. Unfortunately, there may be other equilibria as well including uninformative equilibria where all players simply report the same fixed signal, regardless of their true signal and, typically, the truth-telling equilibrium does not have the highest expected payoff. The… CONTINUE READING
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