• Corpus ID: 142175955

Punishment and Status

  title={Punishment and Status},
  author={Emma von Essen and Eva Ranehill},
In economics there are two main domains of explanation for understanding unequal outcomes. The first considers differences in individual preferences, while the second concerns differences in how individuals are treated.Part I of the thesis comprises four articles pertaining to the first explanation. The main focus of these articles is gender differences in preference. The behaviors studied therein are risk preferences, competitiveness, altruism and cooperativeness. The first study finds no… 

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