Punishment and Repentance

@article{Tasioulas2006PunishmentAR,
  title={Punishment and Repentance},
  author={J. Tasioulas},
  journal={Philosophy},
  year={2006},
  volume={81},
  pages={279 - 322}
}
In philosophical writings, the practice of punishment standardly features as a terrain over which comprehensive moral theories—in the main, versions of ‘consequentialism’ and ‘deontology’—have fought a prolonged and inconclusive battle. The grip of this top-down model of the relationship between philosophical theory and punitive practice is so tenacious that even the most seemingly innocent concern with the ‘consequences’ of punishment is often read, if not as an endorsement of consequentialism… Expand

References

SHOWING 1-2 OF 2 REFERENCES
The right is seemingly endorsed by Duff, 'Penance, punishment and the limits of community', 303 and by John Skorupski in, 'Freedom, Morality, and Recognition: Some Theses of Kant and Hegel
  • Ethical Explorations
  • 1967
See, in this connexion, some illuminating remarks of Griffin's in op. cit