Punishment Despite Reasonable Doubt - A Public Goods Experiment with Sanctions Under Uncertainty

@article{Grechenig2010PunishmentDR,
  title={Punishment Despite Reasonable Doubt - A Public Goods Experiment with Sanctions Under Uncertainty},
  author={Kristoffel Grechenig and A. Nicklisch and Christian Thni},
  journal={Microeconomics: Decision-Making under Risk & Uncertainty eJournal},
  year={2010}
}
  • Kristoffel Grechenig, A. Nicklisch, Christian Thni
  • Published 2010
  • Economics
  • Microeconomics: Decision-Making under Risk & Uncertainty eJournal
  • Under a great variety of legally relevant circumstances, people have to decide whether or not to cooperate when they face an incentive to defect. The law sometimes provides people with sanctioning mechanisms to enforce pro-social behavior. Experimental evidence on voluntary public goods provision shows that the option to punish others substantially improves cooperation, even if punishment is costly. However, these studies focus on situations where there is no uncertainty about the behavior of… CONTINUE READING
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