Punishment Despite Reasonable Doubt - A Public Goods Experiment with Sanctions Under Uncertainty

  title={Punishment Despite Reasonable Doubt - A Public Goods Experiment with Sanctions Under Uncertainty},
  author={Kristoffel R. Grechenig and A. Nicklisch and Christian Thni},
  journal={Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal},
Under a great variety of legally relevant circumstances, people have to decide whether or not to cooperate when they face an incentive to defect. The law sometimes provides people with sanctioning mechanisms to enforce pro-social behavior. Experimental evidence on voluntary public goods provision shows that the option to punish others substantially improves cooperation, even if punishment is costly. However, these studies focus on situations where there is no uncertainty about the behavior of… Expand
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