Public goods provision by asymmetric agents: experimental evidence

  title={Public goods provision by asymmetric agents: experimental evidence},
  author={Matthew McGinty and Garrett Milam},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
Economic theory predicts that individuals will free-ride, providing sub-optimal Nash equilibrium quantities of public goods. However, 25 years of experimental evidence indicates that individuals’ behavior often differs from the Nash prediction. This experiment examines provision in the context of asymmetric benefits and asymmetric costs of providing a public good with declining marginal benefits and increasing marginal costs. The design eliminates the coordination problem at the individual… Expand
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