Public goods experiments without confidentiality : a glimpse into fund-raising

  title={Public goods experiments without confidentiality : a glimpse into fund-raising},
  author={James Andreonia and Ragan Petrieb},
  • James Andreonia, Ragan Petrieb
  • Published 2004
Laboratory researchers in economics assiduously protect the confidentiality of subjects. Why? Presumably because they fear that the social consequences of identifying subjects and their choices would significantly alter the economic incentives of the game. But these may be the same social effects that institutions, like charitable fund-raising, are manipulating to help overcome free riding and to promote economic efficiency. We present an experiment that unmasks subjects in a systematic and… CONTINUE READING
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