Public Projects, Boolean Functions, and the Borders of Border's Theorem

  title={Public Projects, Boolean Functions, and the Borders of Border's Theorem},
  author={Parikshit Gopalan and Noam Nisan and Tim Roughgarden},
  journal={Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation},
Border's theorem gives an intuitive linear characterization of the feasible interim allocation rules of a Bayesian single-item environment, and it has several applications in economic and algorithmic mechanism design. All known generalizations of Border's theorem either restrict attention to relatively simple settings, or resort to approximation. This paper identifies a complexity-theoretic barrier that indicates, assuming standard complexity class separations, that Border's theorem cannot be… 

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    2014 IEEE 55th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
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