Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State: Appendix

  title={Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State: Appendix},
  author={David Stasavage},
Policy Differences Among Parliamentary and Presidential Systems
This chapter examines how the organization of power and authority affects policy outcomes. The focus is on: (1) statutory law; (2) public spending; and (3) policy reversals. The empirical evidenceExpand
State Capacity and Long�?Run Economic Performance
We present new evidence about the long-run relationship between state capacity -- the fiscal and administrative power of states -- and economic performance. Our database is novel and spans 11Expand
Political Institutions and Sovereign Borrowing: Evidence from Nineteenth-Century Argentina
I study the relationship between political institutions and sovereign borrowing when constitutional constraints are systematically chosen to obtain better credit conditions. I argue that the impactExpand
Public Finance and Economic Growth: The Case of Holland in the Seventeenth Century
The debate over the institutions that link economic growth to public finance tends to disregard the need for savings to finance growing public debt. In seventeenth-century Holland the structure,Expand
Coalition Governments and Sovereign Debt Crises
This article examines the domestic politics of sovereign debt crises. I focus on two alternative mechanisms that aggregate the preferences of domestic actors over debt repayment: single-party versusExpand
Norman Schofield: The political economy of democracy and tyranny
  • M. Laver
  • Political Science, Computer Science
  • Soc. Choice Welf.
  • 2009
Securitization of Sovereign Debt: Corporations as a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism in Britain, 1694-1750
This paper shows how Britain used privileged corporations to simultaneously securitize and restructure sovereign debt. Combining the sale of privileges with securitization allowed for multi-partyExpand


Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments
In this article, we argue that the effectiveness of central bank independence and exchange-rate pegs in solving credibility problems is contingent on two factors: political institutions andExpand
Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game
It is shown that legislators can gain from forming political parties, and examples where predictions can be made about the composition of parties are considered. Expand
Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited
This article proposes a revision to existing arguments that institutions of limited government (characterized by multiple veto points) improve the ability of governments to credibly commit. FocusingExpand
Private Investment and Political Institutions
Recent research has demonstrated a negative link between macroeconomic and political uncertainty and levels of private investment across countries. This raises the question whether certain types ofExpand
When are monetary commitments credible? Parallel agreements and the sustainability of currency unions
This article investigates the conditions which make it costly for governments to renege on institutional commitments governing monetary policy. Focusing on one such type of commitment – monetaryExpand
Financial Systems, Economic Growth, and Globalization
This paper brings together two strands of the economic literature -- that on the finance-growth nexus and that on capital market integration -- and explores key issues surrounding each strand throughExpand
Electoral Competition under the Threat of Political Unrest
We study elections in which one party (the strong party) controls a source of political unrest; e.g., this party could instigate riots if it lost the election. We show that the strong party is moreExpand
Good Offices: Intermediation by Corporate Bodies in Early Modern French Public Finance
The old-regime monarchy, particularly during the reign of Louis XIV, did much of its borrowing through the mediation of privileged corporate bodies that sought lenders on the private market and thenExpand
Political Power and the Credibility of Government Debt
If political power and motives to invest in government bonds are positively correlated across voting groups, then a self-selection equilibrium can arise where the government's promise to repay its debt is credible and a formal model is used where the alternative use of wealth is to acquire human capital. Expand
Proposal Rights, Veto Rights, and Political Bargaining
Formal models of political bargaining generally emphasize the importance of the allocation of prerogatives such as proposal and veto rights among the bargainers. However, despite the importance ofExpand