Corpus ID: 211083012

Public Bayesian Persuasion: Being Almost Optimal and Almost Persuasive

@article{Castiglioni2020PublicBP,
  title={Public Bayesian Persuasion: Being Almost Optimal and Almost Persuasive},
  author={Matteo Castiglioni and Andrea Celli and Nicola Gatti},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2020},
  volume={abs/2002.05156}
}
  • Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli, Nicola Gatti
  • Published in ArXiv 2020
  • Computer Science, Mathematics
  • Persuasion studies how an informed principal may influence the behavior of agents by the strategic provision of payoff-relevant information. We focus on the fundamental multi-receiver model by Arieli and Babichenko (2019), in which there are no inter-agent externalities. Unlike prior works on this problem, we study the public persuasion problem in the general setting with: (i) arbitrary state spaces; (ii) arbitrary action spaces; (iii) arbitrary sender's utility functions. We fully characterize… CONTINUE READING

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