Prover anonymous and deniable distance-bounding authentication

@inproceedings{Gambs2014ProverAA,
  title={Prover anonymous and deniable distance-bounding authentication},
  author={S{\'e}bastien Gambs and Cristina Onete and Jean-Marc Robert},
  booktitle={AsiaCCS},
  year={2014}
}
In distance-bounding authentication protocols, a verifier assesses that a prover is (1) legitimate and (2) in the verifier's proximity. Proximity checking is done by running time-critical exchanges between both parties. This enables the verifier to detect relay attacks (also called mafia fraud). While most distance-bounding protocols offer resistance to mafia, distance, and impersonation attacks, only few protect the privacy of the authenticating prover. One exception is the protocol due to… CONTINUE READING
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