Protocol completion incentive problems in cryptographic Vickrey auctions

  title={Protocol completion incentive problems in cryptographic Vickrey auctions},
  author={Phillip G. Bradford and Sunju Park and Michael H. Rothkopf and Heejin Park},
  journal={Electronic Commerce Research},
In spite of attractive theoretical properties, Vickrey auctions are seldom actually used due to information revelation and fear of cheating. Cryptographic Vickrey Auctions (CVAs) have been proposed to protect bidders’ privacy or to prevent the bid taker from cheating. This paper has three parts. First, it identifies ideal goals for CVAs. One of the criteria identifies an incentive problem that is new to the literature on cryptographic Vickrey auctions: the disincentive of a bidder who has… CONTINUE READING

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