Protection for Sale

@inproceedings{Grossman1992ProtectionFS,
  title={Protection for Sale},
  author={Gene m. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman},
  year={1992}
}
We develop a model in which special interest groups make political contributions in order to influence an incumbent government's choice of trade policy. In the political equilibrium. the interest groups bid for protection, and each group's offer is optimal given the offers of the others. The politicians maximize their own welfare. which depends on the total amount of contributions collected and on the aggregate welfare of voters. We study the structure of protection that emerges in political… 

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