Corpus ID: 157741872

Protection States Trust?: Major Power Patronage, Nuclear Behavior, and Alliance Dynamics

  title={Protection States Trust?: Major Power Patronage, Nuclear Behavior, and Alliance Dynamics},
  author={Alexander Lanoszka},
Why do some states that receive a nuclear security guarantee move towards, and sometimes back away from, nuclear weapons? To answer these questions, I propose alliance compensation theory. I argue that allies become more likely to engage in nuclear behavior when they doubt the reliability of the security guarantees they receive from their major power patrons (e.g., the United States and the Soviet Union). Specifically, I show that allies evaluate the strength of these guarantees by referring to… Expand
8 Citations
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