Prospects of enactivist approaches to intentionality and cognition

  title={Prospects of enactivist approaches to intentionality and cognition},
  author={T. Schlicht and Tobias Starzak},
  pages={1 - 25}
  • T. Schlicht, Tobias Starzak
  • Published 2019
  • Psychology
  • Synthese
  • We discuss various implications of some radical anti-representationalist views of cognition and what they have to offer with regard to the naturalization of intentionality and the explanation of cognitive phenomena. Our focus is on recent arguments from proponents of enactive views of cognition to the effect that basic cognition is intentional but not representational and that cognition is co-extensive with life. We focus on lower rather than higher forms of cognition, namely the question… CONTINUE READING


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