Prospects of enactivist approaches to intentionality and cognition

  title={Prospects of enactivist approaches to intentionality and cognition},
  author={Tobias Schlicht and Tobias Starzak},
  pages={1 - 25}
We discuss various implications of some radical anti-representationalist views of cognition and what they have to offer with regard to the naturalization of intentionality and the explanation of cognitive phenomena. Our focus is on recent arguments from proponents of enactive views of cognition to the effect that basic cognition is intentional but not representational and that cognition is co-extensive with life. We focus on lower rather than higher forms of cognition, namely the question… 
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It is argued that recent work on the free energy principle supports the following claims with respect to the life-mind continuity thesis: there is a strong continuity between life and mind; all living systems can be described as if they had representational states; and the ’as-if representationality’ entailed by thefree energy principle is central to understanding both basic forms of intentionality and intentionality in non-basic minds.
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A Complete Bibliography of Publications in Synthese, 2020–2029
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  • Philosophy
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
  • 2022


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In the debate about the nature of social cognition we see a shift towards theories that explain social understanding through interaction. This paper discusses autopoietic enactivism and the we-mode
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Cognition and Life: The Autonomy of Cognition
A philosophical distinction between biological and cognitive domains is proposed based on two conditions that are postulated to obtain a useful characterization of cognition: biological grounding and explanatory sufficiency.
The intentional stance
How are we able to understand and anticipate each other in everyday life, in our daily interactions? Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, asserts
Must cognition be representational?
The reasons against defining cognition in representational terms are that doing so needlessly restricts the authors' theorizing, it undermines the empirical status of the representational theory of mind, and it encourages wildly deflationary and explanatorily vacuous conceptions of representation.
Directive Minds: How Dynamics Shapes Cognition
The future progress of cognitive science looks set to involve ever-increasing efforts to anchor research to the real world poles of sensing and acting. Thus anchored, time, world and body emerge as
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  • P. Lyon
  • Psychology
    Cognitive Processing
  • 2005
The paper describes the frameworks and infers from them ten empirical principles—the biogenic ‘family traits’—that constitute constraints on biogenic theorizing that are superior for approaching a general theory of cognition as a natural phenomenon.