Proposal Rights, Veto Rights, and Political Bargaining

  title={Proposal Rights, Veto Rights, and Political Bargaining},
  author={Nolan McCarty},
  journal={American Journal of Political Science},
  • N. McCarty
  • Published 1 July 2000
  • Political Science
  • American Journal of Political Science
Formal models of political bargaining generally emphasize the importance of the allocation of prerogatives such as proposal and veto rights among the bargainers. However, despite the importance of these arguments for the study of political institutions, little work has been done to clarify precisely what general roles each of these prerogatives play in generating political outcomes. In this article, I develop a sequential-choice bargaining model that incorporates very general allocations of… Expand
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