• Corpus ID: 8295358

Proportional Approval Method using Squared loads, Approval removal and Coin-flip approval transformation (PAMSAC) - a new system of proportional representation using approval voting

@article{Pereira2016ProportionalAM,
  title={Proportional Approval Method using Squared loads, Approval removal and Coin-flip approval transformation (PAMSAC) - a new system of proportional representation using approval voting},
  author={Toby Pereira},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2016},
  volume={abs/1602.05248}
}
  • T. Pereira
  • Published 17 February 2016
  • Computer Science
  • ArXiv
Several multi-winner systems that use approval voting have been developed but they each suffer from various problems. Six of these methods are discussed in this paper. They are Satisfaction Approval Voting, Minimax Approval Voting, Proportional Approval Voting, Monroe's Fully Proportional Representation, Chamberlin-Courant's Rule, and Ebert's method. They all fail at least one of Proportional Representation (PR), strong PR, monotonicity or positive support. However, the new method described in… 

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TLDR
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References

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TLDR
A natural axiom is proposed for approval-based committee voting, i.e. the setting where each voter approves a subset of candidates, and these votes are then used to select a fixed-size set of winners (committee), which is called justified representation ($$\mathrm {JR}$$JR).

Satisfaction Approval Voting

We propose a new voting system, satisfaction approval voting (SAV), for multiwinner elections, in which voters can approve of as many candidates or as many parties as they like. However, the winners

Approval voting

Approval voting has been offered by a number of formal theorists, notably Steven Brams and Peter Fishburn (1983), as a solution to problems occasioned by multicandidate elections. The formal

A minimax procedure for electing committees

Abstract A new voting procedure for electing committees, called the minimax procedure, is described. Based on approval balloting, it chooses the committee that minimizes the maximum Hamming distance

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TLDR
A new concept of proportional representation that takes account of voters' preferences over the full list of alternatives—fully proportional representation (FPR)—and schemes for its implementation are presented.

Representative Deliberations and Representative Decisions: Proportional Representation and the Borda Rule

The development of social choice theory over the past three decades has brought many new insights into democratic theory. Surprisingly, the theory of representation has gone almost untouched by

of Proportional Approval Voting, independently invented by Warren D. Smith) was used to select Oscar nominees

  • of Proportional Approval Voting, independently invented by Warren D. Smith) was used to select Oscar nominees

6: Its name is due to Warren D

  • 6: Its name is due to Warren D

“ Proportionella valmetoder ”

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Notes 1: https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/election-methods-list/conversations/messages

  • Notes 1: https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/election-methods-list/conversations/messages
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