Prophet Secretary for Combinatorial Auctions and Matroids

@inproceedings{Ehsani2017ProphetSF,
title={Prophet Secretary for Combinatorial Auctions and Matroids},
author={Soheil Ehsani and Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi and Thomas Kesselheim and Sahil Singla},
booktitle={ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms},
year={2017}
}
• Published in
ACM-SIAM Symposium on…
30 October 2017
• Mathematics
The secretary and the prophet inequality problems are central to the field of Stopping Theory. Recently, there has been a lot of work in generalizing these models to multiple items because of their applications in mechanism design. The most important of these generalizations are to matroids and to combinatorial auctions (extends bipartite matching). Kleinberg-Weinberg \cite{KW-STOC12} and Feldman et al. \cite{feldman2015combinatorial} show that for adversarial arrival order of random variables…

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